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Address to t e Research Institute of Japan

B. Forster

THRU: Acting DCM - Mr. Barracloughu61
To , The Ambassador

Attached is an invitation to address the May meeting
of the Research Institute of Japan. Since you already
have a number of public statements scheduled for May,
including a major speech in the Kansai, we suggested
that they consider some later dates. They proposed
the following days in September (in descending order
of preference): September 14, 24 or 22. I realize
that this is quite early to be locking in a speaking
engagement for this autumn, but since their monthly
meetings draw over 1,~00 businessmen and journalists,
the ~nstitute needs to know which date is best for you
in order to reserve a meeting room.
We recommend that you agree to speak to this prestigious
group. As they point out in their letter,you attended
one of their meetings as a guest speaker four years ago.
If you approve, this will be your major speech for the
fall.
Accept invitation
Decline
Let's discuss
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Attached is an invitation to address the May meeting
of the Research Institute of Japan. Since you already
have a number of public statements scheduled for May,
including a major speech in the Kansai, we suggested
that they consider some later dates. They proposed
the following days in September (in descending order
of preference): September 14, 24 or 22.
I realize
that this is quite early to be locking in a speaking
engagement for this autumn, but since their monthly
meetings draw over 1,~00 businessmen and journalists,
the institute needs to know which date is best for you
in order to reserve a meeting room.
We recommend that you agree to speak to this prestigious
group. As they point out in their letter,you attended
one of their meetings as a guest speaker f our years ago .
If you approve , this will be y our major speech f or the
fall .
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(Naigai Josei Chosakai)
Telephone :

TOKYO (59t) 11tt

SHISEI KAIKAN BLDG.
1-3 HIBIYA KOEN
CHIYODA-KU. TOKYO.

March 5 , 1981
His Excellency
Mr. Michael J o Mansfield
Ambassador
Embassy of the United States of America
Tokyo, Japan
Dear Mr. Ambassador,
The Research Institute of Japan, owned and operated by the
Jiji Press, is planning to hold its national monthly consultation meeting either on May 18th, 19th or 25th at the
Imperial Hotel, Tokyo. Therefore, we wish to invite Your
Excellency to this meeting as a guest speaker and hear your
speech on how the new Japan-United States relationship should
be. In case any of the above-mentioned date is inconvenient
then it could be during June.
The Research Institute of Japan, for your information, has
162 branch offices in major cities throughout Japan besides
its head office in Tokyo and also three overseas branches in
New York, London and Hong Kong with a total 15,600 membership composed mainly of influential leaders of various Japanese circles and it is contributing to the development of
justifiable public opinion.
In the past, we had the honor of having Dr. Edwin 0. Reischauer,
Mr. William P. Bundy, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, General
Naxwell D. Taylor, Nr. George Ball, MroEugene R. Black, Ambassador James D. Hodgeso~ and other distinguished personalities
as guest speakers of such functions. Particularly, when Your
Excellency spoke at the national meeting held on July 19,
1977, more than 1,000 persons including several Cabinet
ministers at~ended and, as you may recall, your discourse
was played up in front pages of Japan's national dailiesand
the Japanese people in general had the opportunity of learning the essence of Japan-U.S. relations through your explanations.
If Your Excellency kindly accepted our present invitation,
it will be very timely as the timing of your speech will be
contd ••••••••

/
'

..
immediately after the first Japan-U.S. summit conference
under President Reagan's administration and at a time when
the new Japan-U.S. relationship has just started . Not only
members of the Research Institute but all the Japanese
people are expected to listen attentively to your speech.
Moreover, the staff members of the Cabinet and the Foreign
Ministry's Press Clubs as well as the Foreign Correspondents'
Club of Japan will most likely be covering your discourse.
We will greatly appreciate Your Excellency's kind acceptance of our invitation as i t will highly contribute towards
the promotion of mutual understandings between our two
countries. Anticipating a favorable reply,
Yours respectfully,

atsuro
President
THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF JAPAN

.,~!,oo!E~§cE.8R5~~l\§~.
AMERICAN EMBASSY, TOKYO TEL. 583-7141 EXT. 7919

ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR MIKE HANSFIELD
RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF JAPAN
TOKYO, SEPTEMBER 22, 1981
DECADE OF PROGRESS -- FUTURE OF PROMISE

I'm delighted to have the opportunity today to address the
Research Institute of Japan once again and I wish to thank
Chairman Sato for having extended your kind invitation to me.
Your goal of furthering international relations through
understanding is one which has occupied me throughout a long
career in the public service of the United States.

As most of

you well know, I have attempted during my tenure as American
Ambassador to Japan to focus principally on the deepening of
mutual understanding between the

u.s.

and Japan, for I firmly

believe that there is no more important relationship in the
world today than that which exists between our two countries.
Through economic, political and security cooperation, we can
help insure a peaceful, free and diverse world in which all
nations will benefit.

The first time I had the pleasure of addressing you was
more than four years ago, shortly after my arrival as
Ambassador.

At that time America was just emerging from a long

period of domestic political and social malaise brought about
by the unfortunate concurrence of the Watergate crisis and an

81-l9R
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unpopular and divisive military involvement in Vietnam.

In my

speech four years ago I stressed the need for America to put
aside the shadow cast by our recent traumatic domestic and
international experience and resume actively wo rki nJ

t o\ J ar~

new

bases of cooperation with our friends and allies -particularly Japan -- in creating a just and equitable worl d
economic and political order appropriate to the new chall e nges
of the 70's and 80's.

I suggested that Japan and our European

allies aid us in formulating policies and mechanisms to insure
that free world leadership would not falter in responding to
the increasingly complex and vital issues we were facing.

The American people have long since put those dark days of
self-doubt and confusion behind them.

The United States today

is a country united under an administration whose bold,
imaginative programs and leadership have restored to us a sense
of pride in our country's history and purpose in our c o untry's
future.

Crucial to this new-found optimism is a renewed sens e of
cooperative partnership between the U.S. and the people and
government of Japan in vital areas such as security, the
international economic system and trade.

Today I would like to

reflect on the construction of that partnership, espec ially
during the last decade.

Ten years ago , the United States and Japan were
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experiencing a relationship that had all the ups and downs of a
Montana horizon.

The 1960 Security Treaty had just the year

before reached the age when either side could give one year's
notice of its abrogation.

More than 700,000 people throughout

Japan demonstrated against the Treaty on June 23 of that year.
But our governments and the majorities they represented were
able to weather that storm and reconfirm the value of the
agreement which has meant so much to our mutual security.

And the day after the Security Treaty demonstrations, the
first sharp trade conflict between our two nations -- a
breakdown in the textile negotiations -- occurred in
Washington.

In that deadlock, the economic facts of the

discussion were compounded by the threat of protectionist
legislation from the Congress.

After years of hard negotiating

across the Pacific we achieved an acceptable agreement to limit
Japanese exports of textiles to the United States.

During this same period, the reversion of Okinawa also
became an issue of discussion between us.

Although Prime

Minister Sato and President Nixon had agreed, on November 21,
1969, that Okinawa would be restored to Japan in 1972, many
technical problems had to be worked out.
times.

Those were difficult

There were questions about whether the limitations of

the 1960 Security Treaty should apply to Okinawa.

However, we

managed by working together on a basis of mutual respect for
one another's domestic constraints and national
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responsibilities to forge an agreement satisfactory to both
sides.

All these landmark events of a decade ago changed the
relationship between our two countries.

Japan matured as it

carne to realize its position as a nation possessed of both
significant international standing and a resultant increased
share of international responsibility.

The United States

recognized that it was no longer dealing with a "little
brother" but with an equal.

Significantly, there was not a

single demonstration against the security treaty on its
twentieth anniversary last year and the United States and Japan
now, concerning textiles, find themselves on the same side of
the fence.

From the issues of a decade ago, from the experience of
dealing with those issues, we have learned we have more in
common than we have differences.

He have learned to seek joint

solutions as equal partners to problems that may appear at
first to be insoluble.

Perhaps even more importantly, in the

process of learning to resolve difficult disputes between us,
we have learned a great deal about the nature of each other's
societies, political systems and economic structures.

As a

result, our understanding of each other and respect for
differences between our two great nations, as well as the
overall values and goals we both share, have vastly increased.
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He learned from the textile negotiations, for example , a
great deal about the political nature of our economies.

He are

both free market economies heavily dependent upon international
trade.

He both have considerable capital in foreign

investments and depend on imports -- Japan to a greater d egree
-- of energy and raw materials.

But these similarities do not mean we have learned enough
to prevent the recurrence of bilateral trade disputes
throughout this last decade.

Part of the problem has been the

turnaround of the flow of products.

The United States had

traditionally sold more to Japan than it bought.

But in the

mid 1960s the balance changed , and ever since Japan has enjoyed
a trade surpl us.

During the early 1970s the U.S. economy suffered from slow
growth, inflation and balance of payment deficits which were
partly the result of the Vietnam conflict and partly industrial
maturation .

At the same time, Japan ' s economy was growing

robustly and the country enjoyed a substantial boom in the
American market .

Thus, in addition to the problem over Japan's

textile exports, there were bilateral disagreements over
exchange rates and Japan's domestic market, closed to many of
our exports.

Later in the decade , when Japan was more successful than
the United States in adjusting to soaring oil prices, Japan's
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large global current account surplus and bilateral trade
surplus with the United States again strained relations.

I am not surprised -- I think it is simply inevitable
that there is occasional stress between the two largest
economies in the free world.

Economic relations as close as

ours must now and then collide.

This was the case in 1977 and

1978 when the large Japanese global current account surplus,
the U.S. global current account deficit, a heavy imbalance in
bilateral trade, the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the color
TV dumping charge, the steel issue and a number of other trade
problems clashed together, resulting in a period of almost
constant negotiation.

We have emerged from this period with

only a few dents and with our trade ties -- and our friendship
-- intact and flourishing.

There is no doubt that the cooperation of the Japanese
Government has been instrumental in resolving the economic
issues between our two countries.

In 1978 and 1979, it used

fiscal policy to stimulate the economy and induce increased
consumption of imports.

At the same time, it unilaterally cut

tariffs on 318 items, .removed quota controls on 12 products and
increased beef, citrus juice, and orange quotas.

Japan

ratified the codes negotiated in the MTN and agreed to tariff
reductions.

Since the end of the MTN, the United States and

Japan have agreed, in effect, to extend the coverage of the
government procurement code to telecommunication equipment
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purchases by NTT and Japan has entered into an understanding
with us on product standards.

Just this past spring, Japan successfully defused
protectionist sentiment in the United States over the
automobile problem by voluntarily restraining its exports under
a three-year program.

Although neither Government, as a basic

policy, wants constraints on free trade, this agreement
recognized the explosive nature of the automobile problem.
President Reagan has made it clear, as has Secretary Regan of
the Treasury, that the principle of free trade will be strongly
defended by the Reagan administration.

Yet the American auto

industry found itself in a situation which, while not the fault
of Japanese automakers, generated understandable concern with
many members of the U.S. Congress.
slow exports lessened that concern.

The decision by Japan to
The breathing spell

provided by Japan's cooperation should go a long way toward
ensuring that the American auto industry will be able to
commence the restructuring necessary to get itself back on its
feet and start on the path to economic recovery.

During my tenure as Ambassador to Japan a number of
difficult bilateral trade problems have been dealt with
successfully by our two countries.

~fuen

one considers the

magnitude of the problems we have faced and the willingne ss of
both sides to make real sacrifices to achieve mutually
acceptable solutions, we can honestly say that the strength of
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our relationship has been truly tested.

\~ithout

doubt it has

been made stronger in the process.

For example, we have established a series of
bridge-building mechanisms to deal with future problems:
A prestigious group of Japanese and Americans, led by
Ambassadors Ingersoll and Ushiba, was formed to assess
our expanding economic relationship in the larger
context of our shared global responsibilities and to
make recommendations.

Known as the Wisemen, this group,

through its reports and recommendations, better informed
both governments about the manifold aspects -political, business, agricultural, labor, academic and
bureaucratic -- of our economic relationship.
The United States-Japan Trade Study Group is a voluntary
group of Japanese and American businessmen and
government officials who together identify and analyze
measures in Japan which inhibit the sales of U.S.
products and who monitor implementation of the HTN
agreements.
The United States-Japan Trade Facilitation Committee,
formed in September 1977, to help expand our trade to
Japan by identifying and dealing with specific problems
encountered by individual American businessmen when
dealing with Japanese laws or regulations.

It has

reviewed 22 cases of individual trade problems and
satisfactorily resolved 19.
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However, it would be naive to think that trade frictions
between the U.S. and Japan are only a problem of the past.

We

shall need to exert our best and most imaginative efforts to
deal with both the economic realities and political
ramifications of the growing trade imbalance between our two
countries.

According to figures released by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, in the first seven months of calendar year 1981 the
value of United States exports to Japan totalled 12 billion,
717 million dollars, while during that same period U.S. imports
from Japan were valued at 21 billion, 306 million dollars -- a
trade deficit in Japan's favor amounting to 8 billion, 589
million dollars.

The Commerce department projects that if

these trade figures continue at about the same pace for the
remainder of 1981, the u.s.-Japan trade gap for this year alone
will reach a staggering 14 billion dollars.

It is true that much of the increase in this trade deficit
is due to factors largely out of the control of the Japanese
government --such as the dollar's recent appreciation in
relation to the yen, the continuing strength of u.s. consumer
spending versus the relative weakness of consumer spending in
Japan, and the rise in Japanese steel and machinery exports to
a reindustrializing America at a time when U.S. exports of
lumber and coal to Japan have slowed for a variety of reasons.
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However, whatever the causes, Japan's soaring trade surplus
with the U.S. is bound to have serious political repercussions
within the

u.s.

and provide ammunition to those voices calling

for protectionist measures.

We must work together in our efforts to preserve the
free-trade system, so important to both of our countries.

The

U.S. must reinvigorate its industry, produce the quality and
type of goods you desire, and market agressively.

At the same

time, I am confident Japan will take steps to counter the
belief, still strong in the United States, that Japan's market
is closed to our most competitive products.

Most, not yet all,

of the formal barriers to trade have been removed.
remains a difficult market for foreign firms.

Yet Japan

It will be up to

Japan, its government, its business community and its people,
to create an atmosphere where foreign competition is welcomed
as the only way to keep the domestic industry truly strong.
This is not an easy task, but it is essential that our trade
relationship be seen by all as a major two-way highway.

If we

fail to do this, the results could be serious indeed.

Our ongoing discussions on the defense issue are being
pursued in the same spirit of cooperation which has
characterized our approach to economic problems.

v/e respect

the accomplishments Japan has already made in the defense
area.

In light of the current international situation, Japan,

together with ourselves and our European allies, recognizes the
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need to further strengthen its defense capabilities to meet
common security challenges, particularly the unprecedented
Soviet worldwide military buildup.

The United States will

continue to encourage Japan to make steady and significant
improvements in its defense forces, while bearing in mind
Japan's constitutional constraints.

Japan has already taken

measures to strengthen its self-defense capability, including
decisions to purchase the F-15, P-3C and E-2C, as well as other
modern weapons systems.

Japan's increasing contribution to the

cost of maintaining our forces in this country -- amounting to
almost $1 billion a year -- is most welcome, and we hope Japan
will do even more.

In addition, American and Japanese

uniformed services are working together to develop more
detailed contingency plans in accordance with the planning
guidelines adopted by our two governments in 1978.

These developments enhance the credibility of Japan's
self-defense capability, and thereby add strength to the
U.S.-Japan security relationship and its contribution to the
peace and stability of North-East Asia.

Although the United

States favors continued progress in this area and recognizes
that this will require increases in Japanese defense spending,
we will not presume to tell Japan how to spend the money it
budgets for defense.

We will maintain a continuing dialogue

between governments on all of these issues, as is proper and
necessary in an alliance.

However, the United States

recognizes and respects the fact that the pace, the extent and
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the direction of any increase in Japan's defense effort
remains, as it always has been, a sovereign decision for Japan
to make.

In addition, over the past decade there has been a visible
increase in the scope and activism of Japanese diplomacy.

Some

argue that Japan's political influence in the world, and its
diplomatic reach, have not expanded as rapidly as has its
economic power and the scope of its economic interests.

But in

the past few years Japan has taken on major political
responsibilities in a number of areas.

Japan is taking on greater responsibilities for foreign
economic development.
foreign assistance.

From 1976 to 1980 Japan doubled its
In 1981 Japan expects to spend 889 billion

yen and from 1981 to 1985 it intends to again double the amount
it spent on foreign assistance during the five previous years.
Through economic assistance to such strategically important
nations as Thailand, Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt, Japan makes a
very valuable contribution to our common world interests.

Japan's relations with ASEAN countries are no longer
defined solely in economic terms.

Japan's political and

diplomatic support for those nations, no less than its large
and indispensable contribution to the Indochina refugee relief
effort , has added new depth to its role in that region.

The

United States and Japan continue to pursue similar goals in our
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relations with the peaceful nations of Southeast Asia.

We both

seek to contribute to the resilience and the independence of
those nations.

Our policies are in basic agreement, even

though in some respects we remain economic competitors.

But

our competition is healthy and our approaches -- as exemplified
by our participation in the ASEAN meeting in Manila this past
June -- are complementary.

There has been a growing political dimension to Japan's
ties with Canada and the nations of Western Europe.

Two

factors contributing to this process are Japan's active
participation in the OECD and Japan's key role in the annual
economic summit meetings of the major industrialized
countries.

Close trilateral coordination was evident in the

development of a common response to the Iranian hostage
situation and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Japan now

plays an increasingly important and varied role in the world.

During the period when our Embassy in Iran was seized,
Japan spoke out vigorously on behalf of legal and humanitarian
principles, denounced the hostage seizure and called for the
release of those innocent people.

It joined with our European

friends and others around the world in imposing economic
sanctions against Iran which helped lead to the release of the
hostages.

Japan's actions were by no means risk free.

IDdeed ,

among our allies, Japan paid a high price to stand by us, and
for that we are grateful.
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In respect to Afghanistan as well, Japan worked closely
with the United States and our other allies to impose
penalities upon the Soviet Union for its invasion of that
country and to insure that the Soviets understand that such
actions cannot be taken without grave risk.

Japan spoke out

early against the aggression, joined the United States and
other nations in boycotting the Moscow Olympic games, and
participated in a framework of sanctions which we still hope
will have an important cumulative effect.

Japan also paid a

price for its willingness to stand with us on this very
important principle.

The challenges posed by events in Iran and Afghanistan,
like some of the economic and trade problems we have grappled
with in the past few years, have imposed strains on our
relations.

Difficult decisions have been made.

were in order.

Hard choices

Although a satisfactory solution to the Soviet

occupation of Afghanistan remains el~sive, the degree of unity
a nd coordination in the actions of Japan, the United States and
the other industrialized democracies is most heartening.

We

ha ve occasionally differed on tactics, on emphasis or on
timing, but we have remained united and are determined to stay
the course.

As I have traveled throughout Japan, I have spoken often
and in many places about the steady progress of our two nations
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toward a more equal partnership and about Japan's assumption of
international responsibilities commensurate with its economic
power.

The crises in Iran and Afghanistan in particular have

contributed to a greater understanding of this phenomenon by
the Japanese people.

These evehts threatened the interest s of

the international community as a whole and required a united
response by peace-loving nations.

Japan responded to those

needs , demonstrating in the process -- for its own people, f o r
Americans and for the world -- that Japan is a factor to be
r eckoned with on the international scene, and that the bridge
of our partne rship is firm in more than just matters of trade.

Japan's increasingly important r ole in the world has
implications for all nations.

For the United States it means

that the ties with Japan, already th e mos t

impo rtant bilateral

relationship we have, take on even greater significance.

As historian Henry Brooks Adams wrote in 1907, "all
experience is an arch to build upon."

He was writing about his

own education , but it is an apt thought about the experience of
nations as well.

I have in mind, for example, the experience

of Japan and the United. States.
the Second World
power .

\~r

In the years since the end of

Japan has emerged as a major economic

Its relations with the world and especially with the

United States have broadened and become increasin9ly comple x.
During the past ten years alone, there has been a significant
strengthening of the relationship between ou r two nations .

\.Je
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have used the raw materials of our past experience as an arch
to bridge the occasional troubled waters in our trade relations
or to reach agreements on the issue of regional security.

And

today our partnership across the Pacific is stronger and our
relations more interwoven than ever before.

Therefore it is essential that we consult closely with each
other and try to coordinate our policies as much as we can.
The general orientation of our foreign policies will conti nue
to rest on a foundation of similar values, interests and
objectives.

There is no reason to expect any diminut ion 1n

Japanese and American cooperation on major international
issues, be they political, economic, scientific or
security-related.

On the contrary, I believe our partnership

will deepen and produce major benefits, not only for Japan and
the United States, but for the world as a whole.

*

*

*

